This is the sixth instalment in a series of articles in which I have discussed options for the regeneration of naval capability in light of the reality that every ship in the current fleet (with the exception of HMNZS Aotearoa) reaches the end of its forecast life in the early to mid-2030s. This article re-examines the thinking embodied in those earlier articles in the light of the updated policy settings outlined in the Defence Policy and Strategic Statement 2023 and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Future Force Design Principles 2023.

I hold strongly to the premise that I first developed in a paper published in the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy in 2020 – that block obsolescence of the current fleet gives us an opportunity to set in place an affordable naval fleet that delivers on enduring government policy objectives, provided we consider and exploit the technological and doctrinal possibilities of modularity, open computing architectures, and autonomous systems. Fleet design along these lines is absolutely consistent with the Future Force Design Principles (FFDP).

To recap, capability modularity involves the adoption of platforms that can be fitted with removable self-contained capability modules tailored to specific types of operation. The number of platforms acquired can be determined by the number of operations of all types that a given fleet is expected to undertake at any one time, allowing for maintenance and respite. The number and type of capability modules acquired is dependent on the number and type of missions that the fleet is expected to undertake concurrently. 

Fixed Principles

Systems Approach. The first of the three fixed future force design principles is that force design will be based on a systems approach: Ensuring that all components of capability are considered, that future systems are integrated, and that industry is engaged earlier in planning and design. The NZ Defence components of capability are people; research and development; infrastructure; concepts, doctrine and collective training; information technology infrastructure; and equipment, supplies and services. Each of these is addressed below:

People. Prolonged separation from family and friends is often cited by naval people as a disincentive to remaining in the service. If supported by imaginative human resource management practices, modularity could allow personnel tempo to be more effectively managed by only requiring those people needed to operate and maintain the modules required for a particular operation to be deployed.

It would also allow mission module specialists to train using innovative simulation techniques when not deployed, reducing skill fade – a major impediment to combat effectiveness. If not required to deploy when their module is not required,  people are more likely to be available for professional and personal development education and training – maintaining throughput for these critical career stages is one of the most difficult challenges for naval HR managers, and lack of opportunities to undertake such training and education is another significant dissatisfier.

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However, a means would need to be found to address the personnel tempo demands made on people assigned to platforms as opposed to modules, possibly through the rotational crewing concepts that the Royal Navy has adopted with some success.

“the naval forces of the liberal democracies are facing significant numerical overmatch in relation to potential adversaries because the cost of modern multi-function surface combatants has reached a level where even the United States can no longer afford to acquire a numerically sufficient force of high-end destroyers and frigates.”

Research and Development. If mission and platform systems are de-coupled, applying the fruits of R&D programmes to both is much simplified. If a New Zealand start up were to produce an innovative autonomous vehicle, for example, the vehicle and its supporting systems could be integrated and tested as a module before rapid installation in the modular ship. Interestingly, the proposed UK modular capability system, PODS, could include a module specifically designed to allow the in situ development of innovative modular capability.

Infrastructure. If mission systems were based on modules that could be installed or removed using shipboard systems such as the SH Defence Cube, ships could be re-rolled by module replacement wherever a secure alongside berth was available.

Concepts, doctrine, and collective training. In previous articles and papers I have discussed the intersection between modularity and emerging maritime doctrine based on Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO).

To re-cap, the naval forces of the liberal democracies are facing significant numerical overmatch in relation to potential adversaries because the cost of modern multi-function surface combatants has reached a level where even the United States can no longer afford to acquire a numerically sufficient force of high-end destroyers and frigates. DMO therefore spreads the combat power of a naval force over both high-end combatants and less capable but fully networked crewed and autonomous platforms optimised for specific functions – primarily long-range strike and anti-surface warfare. 

Specialisation reduces cost, enabling larger numbers to be acquired than would otherwise be affordable. The greater the number of platforms in a given force, the greater the aggressor’s targeting problem, and thus the greater the likelihood that sufficient platforms will survive an aggressor’s pre-emptive strike to impose an unacceptable cost in retaliatory strikes. DMO thus increases the deterrent effect of naval surface forces.

A modular New Zealand combatant equipped with capability modules appropriate to a given contingency would therefore be a credible contribution to operations with our partners in support of the international rule of law. I would argue that a modular contribution would be more credible than a traditional multi-function combatant, because available investment can be channelled into meaningful specialised capability modules as opposed to having to be spread over a number of mediocre permanently fitted systems in the name of nominal multi-function capability.

Information technology infrastructure. Modularity is largely neutral in relation to the technical means whereby data is exchanged. However, a modular platform could embark IT modules that could greatly enhance command and control for deployed operations by providing Commanders with scalable decision support capability and enhanced connectivity. A traditional multi-mission combatant has severe limitations in that regard.

Equipment, supplies, and services. Capability modules can be maintained as discrete entities without affecting the availability of platforms for other missions. This is one of the primary advantages of modularity – obsolescence can be managed without taking whole platforms out of service for lengthy and technically and financially risky half-life refits. Our experience with the Anzac class Frigate Systems Upgrade program is germane, as is the experience of other navies with similar programs.

Kaitiakitanga. Defence will be guided by Kaitiakitanga (guardianship) in responding, adapting, mitigating, and engaging in response to the climate crisis.  It is impossible to foretell the exact ways in which the climate crisis will require Defence to react in future. However, most forecasts anticipate an increase in natural disasters within our region and in Aotearoa-New Zealand itself.

A modular fleet able to be rapidly re-rolled for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is much more likely to be able to respond with meaningful capability at short notice than the current fleet, or a future fleet based on specialised non-modular combat and patrol platforms.

In addition, it is possible that scientific monitoring programs measuring the impact of climate change may need to be enhanced. Maritime scientific equipment lends itself to modularity; a modular fleet is more likely to be available to provide meaningful support than a specialised fleet.

People. People are the Defence Force’s most important capability. A highly professional, well trained, and skilled workforce is critical to achieve defence policy objectives. As outlined above under components of capability, modularity could allow new, imaginative human resource management models that improve the quality of life and professional and personal development opportunities for our most important capability.

Sliding Principles

In addition to the three fixed future force design principles, there are eight sliding principles. To consider the sliding principles:

Combat Capability.The extent to which the Defence Force is designed to deliver in different levels of conflict intensity and duration. The Defence Force will be able to deploy in a range of situations, from non-combat operations to conflict zones, and be able to regenerate.  I respectfully take issue with the “medium” setting for this principle.

The Defence Policy and Strategic Statement unambiguously highlights current and emerging threats to the international rule of law and to the security of Aotearoa-New Zealand. Our strategic environment is no longer benign, and whether we like it or not, we need meaningful combat capabilities to deal with this reality. To my mind, a setting of medium is inconsistent with our circumstances.

Deterrence is not mentioned in either the Defence Policy and Strategic Statement or the FFDP. Again respectfully, to me this is an oversight. The main purpose of capable defence forces is not to fight wars, but to deter them.

“A modular contribution would be more credible than a traditional multi-function combatant, because available investment can be channelled into meaningful specialised capability modules as opposed to having to be spread over a number of mediocre permanently fitted systems in the name of nominal multi-function capability.”

Our world is made up of a number of interconnecting geopolitical networks based in the main on shared values and common interests. Regrettably, the main nexus of one such network, China, has adopted policies that are in many ways inimical to the interests and values of the network to which Aotearoa-New Zealand belongs.

I do not suggest for an instant that the independent foreign policy valued by so many of our people be abandoned, or that we slavishly hitch our wagon to that of any particular antagonist in the geopolitical conflict with which we are now faced. Nonetheless, a critical component of the collective security efforts of the network to which we belong is the maintenance of forces that affect a potential aggressor’s calculations in such a way that the cost of aggression is self-evidently disproportionate in relation to the likely benefits.

Aotearoa-New Zealand is a direct beneficiary of the deterrent calculus, and until humanity finds a way to order its affairs such that the risk of armed conflict is permanently eliminated, I would argue that we have a responsibility to contribute to it.

Modularity offers a way to contribute to the deterrent calculus calibrated to the perceived needs of a given situation and Aoteraroa/New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.

In the event of heightened tension in a region important to us and our friends, a modular combatant could be deployed initially with capabilities that signalled resolve without undue provocation, such as ISR and expeditionary reconnaissance modules. If the situation were to escalate and our government were to determine that a more substantive combat role was appropriate, modules with surface strike capability could be deployed to a forward port for installation in the deployed platform.

More generally, modularity separates platform and mission systems in a way that allows government far more capability choice, both in initial acquisition and in subsequent through life adaptation to changes in strategic circumstances and capability needs. Modularity therefore allows the setting on the combat capability sliding scale to be altered far more easily than with traditional fleet concepts.

Concurrency. The extent to which the Defence Force can undertake activities in multiple locations simultaneously. The Defence Force will be called to respond to more events in the future, and will increase its ability to undertake a range of activities at the same time. The sliding scale for concurrency is set towards the high end, reflecting justifiable concern that future contingencies are likely to be multi-facetted, requiring simultaneous combat readiness and humanitarian assistance capability (for example). The flexibility of a modular force of common platforms is far more suited to dealing with concurrent contingencies than a force consisting of specialised platforms.

Resilience. The extent to which Defence is prepared for shocks. The Defence Force will develop more resilience, including being able to maintain defence capability during times when supply chains are fragile and networks (including digital) are disrupted. By standardising on systems across a fleet of largely common platforms, modularity increases resilience by reducing the number of supply chains that have to be maintained.

Flexibility. The extent to which Defence can respond to a range of circumstances, covering both organisational and capability flexibility.  The advantages of modularity in relation to the flexibility principle are much greater than a traditional fleet mix of specialised platforms. 

Scalability. The extent to which the Defence Force is able to rapidly expand if required. It will improve its ability to rapidly expand or reduce its capabilities, and structures, allowing it to adapt to future changes in the strategic environment.  Scalability is another principle that is much more easily applied to a modular fleet of common platforms than to a fleet of specialised platforms in which mission systems are tightly coupled to platform systems. Should strategic circumstances change, modules suited to new and emergent threats could be acquired.  

Partnered. The extent to which the Defence Force is capable of acting independently or in partnership. Defence will maintain its level of partnership including its ability to lead operations in the region. It will continue to partner with other government and non-governmental agencies, New Zealand’s ally Australia, Pacific partners, other security partners, and industry.

A modular fleet could be dynamically tailored to suit the needs of particular operations being carried out in conjunction with other forces and agencies. Modularity also offers the prospect of greater partnering with New Zealand industry and research institutions. Innovative capability could be developed and fielded as new modules, promoting indigenous solutions to capability problems.

Technological Approach. The extent to which the Defence Force pursues leading edge technologies to support systems and capabilities. The Defence Force will seek opportunities to adopt technologies earlier in their lifecycle once proven, and in line with what our partners are doing. Defence will not seek to be at the leading edge.

Technology insertion is much easier to accomplish with a modular approach. Technology can be developed and tested within the module without disrupting host platform availability. Partner nations are rapidly developing modular technology, particularly for autonomous systems, making it likely that there will be a wide arc of choice in selecting modules for emergent functions.

System Complexity. The extent to which the Defence Force acquires capabilities that are simple to operate, repair, and maintain. The force will seek lower system complexity, including acquiring off-the-shelf instead of bespoke military capabilities where possible. Some systems will be proprietary, but generally simpler systems will be sought. The simplicity inherent in modular architectures is consistent with this principle, noting that simplicity and sophistication are not mutually exclusive concepts.

The counter argument

The advantages conferred by modularity have been formally recognised by a number of our partner navies, most notably the Royal Navy with the recently published Maritime Operating Concept and Maritime Modularity Concept documents. It is becoming increasingly rare for any naval product to be marketed without some reference to the extent to which it is compatible with modularity, even if such benefits are somewhat difficult to identify.

It can be said with confidence that modular concepts are taking hold and will shape the naval fleets of the future. However, there is as yet no platform that fully embodies modularity in detailed design or production. Any approach to the adoption of modularity must be tempered by this reality.

Naval engineers and logisticians rightly maintain that “parent navy” responsibility for a platform unique to our navy is a thing to be avoided if at all possible. This means that any exploration of modular potential should be carried out in partnership with other navies with like requirements. The UK is an obvious choice given the Type 32 program which is likely to be highly modular, but so is Australia given the emergence of the “Tier 2” combatant requirement outlined in the Australian Defence Strategic Review. Tri-lateral exploration of this possibility seems clearly indicated.

A final word

I have consistently advocated for the investigation of a modular approach to next generation fleet design, as I believe that it is the only way in which naval capability effective across the full spectrum of potential missions can be acquired within reasonable cost bounds.  However, this position, like any other bearing on defence investment choices, must be tested to destruction. It must be tested alongside non-modular and less-modular capability options to determine if the benefits outlined above can in fact be realised within acceptable cost and risk bounds.

We have highly capable people within the capability divisions of the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF, but establishing an evidence-based way ahead will require that they have the resources needed to consider these matters in the necessary depth. I hope these resources will be forthcoming.