Dr Reuben Steff is a senior lecturer at the University of Waikato, where he teaches courses on geopolitics, international relations and global security.

OPINION: In December 2021, the Government released a defence assessment declaring that New Zealand’s security environment was being transformed by strategic competition between the United States and China, as well as climate change.

This should have been a major wake-up call for our people, government, academics and media to immediately consider what the “team of 5 million” should do to confront those mounting challenges.

But little has happened and, since 2021, things have got worse. Indeed, the assessment hardly registered.

Much of New Zealand’s foreign policy commentary only reinforces complacency, and our independent foreign policy concept is used by some to reinforce inaction.

 

The New Zealand people deserve systematic analysis of vital geopolitical issues, yet the gulf between understanding of the country’s deteriorating security environment and the Government’s response is growing ever wider.

Likewise, our politicians need to extend themselves beyond restating generalities.

Let’s briefly consider US-China strategic competition.

In February 2022, Russia launched the largest war in Europe since World War II. Just weeks prior, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a “limitless partnership” – a de facto alliance to reorder the world in their favour.

Standing in their way is a coalition of states including the United States, its European and Asian allies, and close partners including New Zealand. Most in this coalition believe in liberal democracy, just like us.

Whatever one’s personal ideological or moral perspective is, it’s important to recognise that the international rules-based order New Zealand relies on for its security and prosperity is being challenged in Ukraine.

This order is fundamentally underpinned by the willingness of the US, and its allies, to uphold it – but existing commentary in New Zealand has done a poor job of convincingly explaining this to the public.

Indeed, we will likely look back at the Russia-Ukraine war as the first major clash in the US-China strategic competition.

Putin would not have invaded Ukraine without knowing China would provide diplomatic cover and continue purchasing Russian oil and gas, with Beijing serving as Moscow’s vital lifeline in the face of Western sanctions.

Ultimately, the US-China competition will define the coming years and decades – Ukraine is significant, but just one episode.

Meanwhile, China is pursuing the largest military build-up in modern history, now has the largest navy in the world, and it is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the prospect of war over Taiwan is growing while the balance of influence in the South Pacific – our own region – is changing due to China’s expanding position.

Regional responses are already underway: Japan is going to double its military spending by 2027, the US is shifting its military and invigorating its alliances with the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, while directing more resources to parts of the South Pacific.

Attention is now focused on New Zealand’s consideration of joining Pillar II of the Aukus trilateral security pact to share emerging technologies. Many commentators are against it – some even seem to relish rejecting our closest ally in Australia, and the US and UK.

But the agreement is necessary if New Zealand is to remain interoperable with these states and to maximise our capabilities in an increasingly unpredictable future.

Improving our capabilities and acquiring emerging technologies should not be viewed as “militarising” NZ’s response.

What they can do is improve our deterrence, our ability to respond to threats, to help people in need by rapidly and capably reacting to national, regional, and international crises, whether they are of a humanitarian nature or stem from a threat to the rules-based order.

They are about trying to secure peace and ensuring our capabilities are the best they can possibly be.

Let’s also not forget that our military personnel are real people made up of flesh and blood. Presumably we want them to be as well-protected as they can be when they go into harm’s way.

For a small nation, it’s also important to have allies and friends – they may prove critical should (or when) we face emergencies in the future. They are the nations most likely to quickly come to our assistance.

Aukus Pillar II will also have economic benefits and is not related to nuclear power or submarines.

Additionally, significant changes are happening in our region while the NZ Defence Force (NZDF) is in a state of crisis. The NZDF faces record attrition levels, poor morale, and has little naval and air power.

Indeed, as Defence Minister Andrew Little recently said, had a second significant event occurred in New Zealand or the broader South Pacific region while the NZDF was dealing with the aftermath of Cyclone Gabrielle, it would have struggled to properly respond.

Then consider that the frequency and severity of climate-induced disasters will increase in the coming years while the prospect of miliary crises are growing.

By all accounts New Zealand is unprepared. It’s becoming less resilient and capable over time. While we are good at diplomacy what we need now is to bolster our deterrence and defence capabilities.

Taking the moral high ground through a frankly neo-isolationist response may make us feel better in the short run. But it is ultimately self-defeating.