I would like start by thanking the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, for the invitation to attend this conference and for the opportunity to speak. As a retired army officer and a serving diplomat I feel privileged to be here among you today and be part of a conversation addressing naval and maritime security issues.
I am here to talk to you about a subject which, in the past I have been very much engaged, and of which I still maintain a close interest; that is, to share with you my views on how New Zealand deals with domestic and external security risks, and in particular how we approach these risks from a whole-of-government or interagency cooperative perspective.
From my previous careers and prior to joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 2011, I was the head of the New Zealand Customs Service and before that the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand. In both these roles I worked closely with other security sector agencies to counter or mitigate risks to the security of the people, the borders, the natural resources and the broader security interests of New Zealand. It is with this background that I will address you today.
During this presentation I intend to briefly discuss New Zealand’s geo-political situation and describe the contemporary threats and risks that New Zealand faces and the challenges in dealing with them. Acknowledging that this is a sea power conference, I will try and contain the discussion to the maritime security space, but I may take the liberty of heading inland, if required, to provide an example or to illustrate a point. I will then discuss how these threats and risks are addressed in New Zealand’s context by discussing examples of whole-of-government approaches and interagency cooperation.
Geo-Political Situation
New Zealand is geographically remote, described as ‘the last bus stop on the planet’ and our hemisphere is dominated by vast areas of water and a couple of large land masses to the west and south. It is considered by many to be small; however, it just looks small because of all the water around it and in comparison to Australia and Antarctica. New Zealand, in terms of land area, is roughly equivalent to the size of the United Kingdom. Interestingly, there is a (small) school of thought that would suggest that New Zealand is twice the size of India, except the problem with this comparison is that 96 per cent of it is under the sea.
Putting the size argument aside, New Zealand does have a small population and relatively modest economy. New Zealand has a current population of 4.4 million and a gross domestic product of about US$130 billion. To provide some context, New Zealand’s population is equal to that of Sydney or the population of Queensland, and as far as gross domestic product is concerned New Zealand’s world ranking is 63rd whereas Australia is 18th. These comparatively modest numbers will be put in context when I come to discuss the challenges that New Zealand has in dealing with threats to security.
Through increasing levels of inter-connectivity and 24/7 access to the world’s financial institutions, globalisation has brought New Zealand as it has the rest of the world closer, in a virtual sense, to the global economic market and to that end in the digital age, we benefit to some extent by virtue of the fact that we are the first country to see the sun; but, the physical reality is that New Zealand remains geographically remote and highly dependent on trade routes in the air and on the oceans.
Moreover, as greater than 95 per cent by volume of New Zealand’s trade is transported by ship, the security of the international sea lines of communication that link New Zealand to her markets is very important to us. Equally important is the protection of the natural resources (fish stocks, oil and gas, and minerals) that are found in our exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
Regardless of geography, since the time of the great canoes, New Zealanders have long travelled to the four corners of the world: to the highest mountains, across broadest oceans and in so doing participated in world events. Whether they are costly wars, international engagement, scientific invention, innovation and leading social policy initiatives: isolation is not and has never been in our national interest.
Despite the importance of the sea to New Zealand’s economy, most New Zealanders view the sea that surrounds the country as a bulwark against external threats and a place to conduct recreational activities.
Unlike Australia, which was bombed during World War II and there are now almost daily reports of asylum-seeking boat-people heading to and/or arriving in your waters, the New Zealand public are generally blissfully unaware of the risks that exist in the maritime environment until an event occurs such as the grounding of MV Rena in the Bay of Plenty in early October 2011.
In terms of size, geography, resources and future opportunities, New Zealand’s maritime environment is an important strategic asset that needs to be understood and protected, in order that benefits can be realised now and in the future.
New Zealand’s maritime interests cover an immense area and include: the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf extension; the Southern Ocean to the south of New Zealand and the Ross Dependency; and we also have constitutional obligations for the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau.
We also have responsibilities under various international agreements such as search and rescue, and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission.
Threats/Risks to New Zealand
Like other maritime nations the threats and risks that New Zealand faces include use of the sea by those who engage in activities such as: piracy, transnational crime, unauthorised maritime arrivals, illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, prohibited imports and exports, compromises to biosecurity, marine pollution, and maritime terrorism.
More generally, maritime interests closer to New Zealand include maintaining good order at sea to protect our border, secure the sea lines of communication, manage our natural resources, and protect our offshore infrastructure such as oil and gas installations and undersea telecommunications links.
Some risks are increasing, particularly those involving transnational organised crime, and those linked to increasing world demand for food and other resources. It is this latter issue that poses the most immediate future threat as the poor state of fishing stocks in the northern hemisphere is seeing a displacement of effort into southern hemisphere fisheries with the consequential pressure on our fish stocks in terms of sustainability.
This is evidenced by the growing number of foreign flagged vessels fishing in the high seas around New Zealand and in the fisheries of the Te Vaka Moana countries (Tonga, Niue, Tokelau, Samoa and Cook Islands). The fisheries in the region are a cornerstone for the economies of these countries and any collapse of those fisheries could potentially lead to economic and/or political instability.
The increased number of foreign flagged fishing vessels in our exclusive economic zone has resulted in a number of instances of illegal, unregulated or unreported (IUU) fishing activity in the past 12 months and this threat is expected to increase. Similarly, IUU fishing activity throughout the Pacific region is increasing and recent patrols (by air) have noticed a disturbing trend of vessels operating with all identifying features removed.
IUU fishing activity is also on the increase in the Southern Ocean and in some cases the vessels operating in this area are using fishing methods that have been banned, for example, those methods that result in significant by-catch of sea birds. As noted above, marine pollution events always strike a chord with the general public.
As this audience knows well, the risk of collision or grounding at sea is always present, especially when operating in congested waterways or in close proximity to navigational hazards. These risks are mitigated through good seamanship, well-charted shipping lanes and the use of modern navigation systems. Notwithstanding, on 5 October 2011, the container ship Rena ran aground on a well-chartered reef off one of New Zealand’s busiest ports.
For months, contractors have worked tirelessly to remove fuel oil and offload containers; however, weather conditions in January 2012 did not help and as we saw in the media a few weeks ago, Rena has split in two and remains a major environmental hazard to New Zealand’s coastal waters.
With respect to potential risks or threats to New Zealand, the issue that is at the forefront of senior security sector officials’ minds at the moment is the mass arrival by sea of illegal immigrants. Over a number of years, information is indicating that as well as Australia and Canada, New Zealand is a target destination for those asylum seekers who are willing and able to circumvent the system and pay people-smugglers to transport them to a third country to attempt to fast-track their bid to immigrate.
While I acknowledge that the Australian policy in this area in a state of flux, depending on the outcome of that policy debate and in the face of the hazards that a long open-ocean transit would involve, the risk of New Zealand becoming a destination for asylum seekers is likely to increase. The arrival of the Sri Lankan asylum-seeker vessel MV Sun Sea in British Colombia, Canada in 2010 is an example of the distances and risks that people-smugglers and potential illegal immigrants are prepared to take.
The NZ Customs Service is responsible for the operational execution of any plans to intercept board and escort any arrival to a holding area. Immigration maintains the policy lead and the processing of arrivals.
Our plans are well tested and rehearsed but like any plan it relies on the competencies of all parties and the reality that no plan survives beyond H Hour.
Challenges
As I mentioned earlier, New Zealand has a small population base and comparatively modest economy. This coupled with the current international economic environment and, closer to home, the economic shock resulting from the Christchurch earthquakes means that all government departments are taking budget cuts and all government spending is coming under increasingly closer scrutiny.
New Zealand has always been resource constrained; however, the current economic situation has refocused attention on government spending with a commitment to return to budget surplus in 2014-15. As a result there is a concerted drive within the public sector to economise while at the same time improve performance and accountability.
‘Working smarter’ is not just a bumper sticker in the New Zealand public service; we have to do it as a matter of financial survival. Put simply, we have to find better and smarter ways of doing business, and the security sector is not immune from this reform process. The quotes below from the deputy prime minister on 31 May 2011 provide a flavour of government’s thinking:
- the government is committed to getting better value for money from public spending so that we can deliver better public services to taxpayers with little or no new money over the next few years ...
- this is about identifying the things that matter most, doing them better and doing them with less back-office bureaucracy...a clear focus on value-for-money, innovation, high-quality service provision and effective change management.
It has already been identified that New Zealand has too many government agencies for a democracy of our size and that more coordination is required across agencies to realise efficiencies to move resources from the back-office functions to frontline services. We have recently seen the Ministry of Fisheries being absorbed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and there will be further reductions in the number of government agencies as the state sector reform program progresses.
As you are probably aware the New Zealand Defence Force is leading the charge with an aggressive value-for-money reform program underway to release money from the ‘back’ of the organisation to fund future capability acquisitions. Much of this arose out of the Defence Review 2010 of which I was part of an independent three member Ministerial Panel.
Other agencies will also be embarking on internal reform programs with the aim of maintaining current outputs with reduced budgets.
In addition to the financial challenge, the wider security sector has to deal with the common perception that New Zealand is ‘safe’ from external threats and the view that public money would be better spent in other areas such as the education and health sectors.
The Rena grounding has raised public awareness of the risk of a major marine pollution event happening in our waters and the yearly deployment of the Japanese whaling fleet to the Southern Ocean focuses public opinion on the fragility of sustaining the whale population, yet there is a public ‘blindness’ to the capability and rate of effort required to protect our borders and natural resources, and maintain sovereignty over the vast expanses of ocean in New Zealand’s immediate area of interest.
So with these challenges in mind, how do New Zealand government agencies work together to meet government’s requirements in the security of our maritime interests?
Whole of Government/Interagency Approach
My challenge now is to provide you with tangible examples to illustrate how using a whole-of-government or close working interagency approach has benefited New Zealand in the maritime security environment.
I will start with the National Maritime Coordination Centre. Following a number of reviews and at government direction, it was established in 2003 with the aim of integrating the work of all agencies to ensure that there was a comprehensive national strategy for managing maritime risks.
It is an integral part of the New Zealand Customs Service but operates independently with staff comprising personnel seconded from Customs and Defence as well as liaison officers from Police and Fisheries. It is physically located within Headquarters Joint Force New Zealand, which not only provides operational benefits but also is very cost effective.
Using a risk management process, effects based tasking priorities are determined and in consultation with the asset owners, it coordinates the allocation of platforms to achieve effective and efficient outcomes.
As most of the assets that are provided are from Defence, the fact that it is colocated at the Operational HQ (and sits between the J3 and J2 areas) assists greatly in terms of liaison, planning and managing day-to-day multi-agency operations.
Spawned from the National Maritime Coordination Centre and developed by the New Zealand Defence Force, a good example of interagency cooperation has been the introduction of a Multi-Agency Network at the restricted level (MAN-R). Not so long ago each agency - such as the New Zealand Defence Force, Customs, Fisheries, Police - operated systems that provided secure communications within their own organisations but were unable to talk or pass operational data by secure means between the other government agencies.
The problem was exacerbated by the requirement for Fisheries and Customs to communicate with their people embarked in ships or aircraft. MAN-R is now deployed and is providing an effective command and control tool to support multiagency operations in the maritime environment. The next step will be to move it to a more highly classified domain.
New Zealand’s capability and capacity to conduct maritime patrol and response activities in our exclusive economic zone, the Southwest Pacific and the Southern Ocean has increased significantly with the introduction into service of the inshore and offshore patrol vessels that were purchased under the auspices of Project Protector.
The inshore patrol vessels have been operating successfully in New Zealand’s coastal waters for over two years now. They have done sterling work in support of many different agencies with tasking including resource protection, interdiction of potential drug trafficking vessels, counting marine life for the Department of Conservation, disaster relief response, and search and rescue.
Since their introduction into service, customs officers, as well as officers from other agencies, have regularly deployed in these vessels and many of the vessels operations are Customs based and supported through the National Maritime Coordination Centre. They not only work in concert with other New Zealand Defence Force platforms but also with Customs aerial surveillance and surface patrol assets.
Meanwhile the offshore patrol vessels have spent the past year or so conducting trials, working up and exploring their operating envelopes in the outer reaches of the exclusive economic zone, the Southwest Pacific, the deep Southern Ocean and the Ross Sea.
As I mentioned earlier, both the inshore and offshore vessels were delivered as part of the Project Protector package. This project provides a good example of the whole-of-government approach. From the early stages of the project, stakeholder agencies were involved to ensure that their capability requirements were included in the function and performance specification documentation and this involvement continued through the tender evaluation process.
Not all of the individual capability requirements were met; however, by being involved in the process and party to the trade-off discussions meant that the other agencies understood why certain decisions were taken and had a good feel for what the project would ultimately deliver.
While New Zealand’s maritime patrol capability and capacity has been significantly enhanced in recent times, the key enabler for the effective and efficient employment of maritime patrol assets is intelligence.
Sharing of information between government agencies in the past has been problematic largely due to the lack of a common data storage/retrieval system and the requirement to protect third party sources. This had certainly been the case with those agencies involved in border security.
Notwithstanding these constraints, the New Zealand Customs Service has taken the lead and established an Integrated Targeting and Operations Centre located at Customs House in Auckland.
The mission of the Integrated Targeting and Operations Centre is to support the command and coordination of border sector operations, across New Zealand’s layered border enforcement strategy. The agencies that are currently represented at it are: Customs, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Biosecurity, Immigration, Maritime New Zealand, and Police.
It is a 24/7 facility and is set up to facilitate different pieces of information and intelligence from different sources to be brought together in one place, allowing patterns to emerge under analysis and with the potential to improve the tactics we use to keep the border secure. There is still no common automated computer-based system of pooling information; however, by having representatives from the various agencies involved with border operations together in one place, this has appreciably enhanced New Zealand’s protection from a border control perspective.
The establishment of the Integrated Targeting and Operations Centre did come with some reputation and interagency relationship risk; however, it was a risk worth taking. It required agencies to work together on border security and its success has already been demonstrated in intercepting drugs and illegal immigrants at the border. The examples of interagency cooperation I have provided to this point have very much been at the tactical and operational level. I will now touch briefly on how security sector interagency arrangements are managed at the strategic level.
The role of the Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination is to act on the Prime Minister’s behalf to exercise policy oversight of the New Zealand intelligence community and ensure that the agencies which constitute this community are efficient, effective, balanced and responsive in the performance of individual and collective responsibilities, and that they are geared to provide timely, relevant and useful intelligence and assessments on developments which are likely to affect New Zealand. It also maintains oversight of security within government departments and agencies and is responsible for setting standards or requirements for government departments and agencies to follow. The Committee provides advice and guidance on policy and operational matters relating to counter-terrorism and the management of terrorist incidents. From time to time, the Committee also provides advice to Cabinet or relevant sub-committee on external security matters where a coordinated interdepartmental stream of policy advice is appropriate.
Over the past 18 months in New Zealand there have been a number of events that have required a multi-agency response. These events include the two significant Christchurch earthquakes (4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011), the Pike River Mine disaster (November 2010), and the Rena grounding. In this list I would also include the considerable interagency planning and execution of the security arrangements for the New Zealand hosted Rugby World Cup in 2011.
The success to the multi-agency responses to these events has come about, in large part, by close interagency cooperation built on personal relationships that have developed at all levels in the various agencies including those in the wider security sector.
These personal relationships and a working knowledge of how each others’ agencies operate pay dividends: during planning and coordination meetings when priorities need to be set; during operations when there are competing demands for resources; and, especially when responding at the national level to unforeseen events.
Conclusion
In conclusion, New Zealand is remote in a geographical sense yet faces many of the same maritime risks and threats that confront other less isolated maritime nations. Notwithstanding, there is a perception in the general public that New Zealand is ‘safe’ from external threats.
New Zealand has always been resource constrained but is currently experiencing greater challenges as a result of the global financial crisis and the financial burden of rebuilding Christchurch.
What we have learnt is that only through interagency coordination can the best results occur, especially when constrained by tight financial circumstances. The benefits are immense, the outcomes obvious and tangible.
State sector reforms are driving government agencies to implement smarter ways of doing business including greater cooperation between agencies to make more effective and efficient use of taxpayer funds.
Finally, the security sector has a good track record of adopting wholeof-government approaches and benefiting from working in multi-agency frameworks, but there is still more that can be done to improve performance and achieve desired security outcomes.
