In August 1921, Henry Wigram summed up the attitude of New Zealanders to the necessity of establishing the aerial defence of our shores by writing that the government was hampered by a strong section of the community opposed to expenditure on armament.

At the time many citizens had pacifist views in response to WW1 and possibly believed that our country was too remote to be attacked. The government itself was in a post-war environment of austerity and uncertainty further dampening interest in military aviation. It was a challenging time trying to convince New Zealanders of the advantages of air power. One of Wigram’s initiatives was to sponsor a national essay competition on the topic: The Use of Aircraft in the Defence of New Zealand. Through the competition he hoped to gain the latest insights into military aviation, and educate the public by publishing the winning essays.

Wigram was not an air power theorist, but he understood the value of air power in the defence of New Zealand. As a maritime nation, he viewed attacks by ship-borne aircraft as a major concern and re-iterated that “the only defence against an aerial attack is by defeating it in its own element; in other words, by securing the command of the air”.

Further, Wigram was intrigued with American bombing trials conducted a month beforehand by Billy Mitchell, who managed to sink the German battleship Ostfriesland in 25 minutes. Clearly, air power had a vital role to play in the maritime defence of New Zealand.

In Wigram’s day landbased military aircraft could not attack New Zealand’s shores, though he was aware that as aircraft technology improved, then islands could be used as stepping stones. Wigram noted that if war broke out again, there would be a need to protect garrison troops sent to defend Pacific islands.

Wigram’s foresight came to fruition during the Pacific War as Japanese Forces took control of vast swathes of the Pacific in four months. The speed with which islands could be over-run and used as forward bases was startling. Over time, Allied forces, including the RNZAF, found that islands could be re-captured after significant effort and used to advantage or isolated and by-passed in order to achieve a greater objective. Ultimately, the Pacific War highlighted the value of using integrated air, land, and naval forces to defeat adversary forces in an expansive archipeligean maritime environment – with air power setting the tempo of operations.

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The general pattern of Southwest Pacific operations was to advance the line of forward operating bases to project attacks on Japanese forces. From these bases, Allied air power could: maintain local air superiority, neutralise distant Japanese airfields, carry out air surveillance, provide close air support to amphibious landing forces, provide air logistic support to air and ground forces, and move troops rapidly - including para-troop insertions.

This operational plan might sound daunting if carried out today, but the NZDF practiced much of it during Exercise Joint Venture 86. All three services operated as an integrated force under the control of a Joint Force Commander who was based in Rarotonga. The exercise encompassed over 1000 personnel, 11 military exercises and 25 civic aid tasks during July, 1986. RNZAF deployed 13 aircraft to the Cook Islands including: C-130s, Andovers, B727, Iroquois, Skyhawks, and Orions.

After initial air reconnaissance to establish enemy strength and position, Special Forces were flown from New Zealand and parachuted into the sea for a covert insertion. This prepared the way for three C-130’s to rapidly insert 150 high-readiness troops – each C-130 took off again 90 seconds later to make way for the next C-130. Skyhawks were flown from New Zealand to provide close air support to the landed troops, followed by maritime attack of adversary ships. Forward air controllers flying in Wasp helicopters provided joint fires targeting information to RNZN frigates and Skyhawks. Once the ‘adversary’ airfield and surrounding area was secured, the remainder of forces could be landed by air and ship. The B727 provided strategic airlift, the Iroquois and Andovers provided inter-island air logistic support. A number of soldiers with mock injuries were used to test the aero-medical evacuation capability of the RNZAF on return flights. The broad exercise concept was repeated in Western Samoa as Exercise Joint Venture 88.

Defence Capability Plan 2019 describes the context of operations in the South Pacific in a general sense. The context can apply equally to combat, stabilisation operations, or HADR, where it requires NZDF to hold high-readiness capabilities on standby to respond to events in the Pacific. The plan describes how deployed forces will operate cohesively across the five warfare domains in a high-risk environment, and support local communities to build security, which will be completed over three broad phases:

Phase 1 – Air reconnaissance to provide situational awareness, identifying the scale and impact of an event, movements of people and the state of critical infrastructure. Subsequent landing via sea and/or air of special operations forces, including minesweeping, physical inspection of infrastructure, and surveying of sea routes for subsequent landings.

Phase 2 – Landing of amphibious forces using landing craft and helicopter forces operating from sealift vessels, as well as air insertion of a highreadiness land combat company to secure and stabilise the event.

Phase 3 – Sustainment and rotation of medium readiness forces until stability is restored.

There is a fundamental capability missing today compared with the Pacific War and Exercise Joint Venture 86 and 88: air combat. The principle role of the air combat force in the New Zealand context was strategic in nature as it provided credibility of intent in defending sovereignty (deterrence), and the provision of deployable strike capabilities for regional collective security. The air combat force was also tactical as it provided control of the air to enable air, ground, and sea manoeuvre; and help prepare NZDF air, land and sea forces to operate in contested environments.

It is difficult to consider high-risk manoeuvre operations without having control of the air. If it is required to gain access within contested airspace of an island nation, provide strike support to land and sea forces, and protect NZDF platforms and personnel, then allied air combat forces may be requested to provide control of the air. Their capacity to do so depends on events unfolding in their own region

Wigram’s fundamental point was that control of the air in the New Zealand context was defensive in nature – to defend the sovereignty of the Realm of New Zealand. The social and fiscal constraints of his time remain evident today, and they are valid to an extent. The Pacific Islands remain the historical battleground of the RNZAF, and we should continue to study the lessons of the Pacific War and Exercise Joint Venture. The latter exercises provided an opportunity to test and project all of the NZDFs military capabilities into the Pacific Islands. The Defence Capability Plan suggests the same broad capabilities are required today and in the future.

Key Points

• Henry Wigram considered control of the air a vital component of New Zealand’s defence, while acknowledging the issue of cost and public concern.
• Control of the air offers strategic and tactical capabilities in defence of the Realm of New Zealand.

Further Reading

1. Wigram, his appendix to ‘the use of aircraft in the defence of NZ’ of 1921.
2. AAP 1000-D Air Power Manual.