The assault, capture and subsequent withdrawal from Chunuk Bair, Gallipoli between 6 and 10 August 1915 is established as a milestone in New Zealand history. Kiwi troops briefly held the heights on 8 August. The carnage numbed the country. Anzac Day was established a year later.
What have we learned? What do we mean when we say “Lest we forget?”
You would think that this battle, which we commemorate today (8 August) and hundreds of others before and after might cause us to ensure we avoid making the same mistakes. Mistakes like allowing our troops to be under the command of people whose intent, conduct and ability differ vastly from our own. Mistakes like sending poorly trained and ill-equipped troops into battle. Mistakes like allowing our foreign policy to be dictated or heavily influenced by those who were our biggest trading partners. The list of mistakes could be a long read all its own.
This is my 150th article on UNCLAS. My 50th post was about reform of ranks and greater use of bi-lingualism. The 100th post was a piece of fiction about Kiwi peacekeepers in a foreign land as a response to Covid-19-induced global unrest.
This article is contrarian in nature and is focussed on the lack of a sense of urgency in preparing for inevitable conflict.
In the last week, the New Zealand government has released three documents relating to national security:
- Aotearoa’s National Security Strategy: Secure Together Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki
- Defence Policy and Strategy Statement
- Future Force Design Principles
These were preceded by a public consultation exercise, a long-term insights briefing and a foreign policy assessment
In the coming week, we expect the release of an updated threat assessment.
Since Defence Minister Andrew Little’s announcements last week, there has been at least a dozen stories a day ranging from the importance of New Zealand’s ‘first ever’ national security strategy, to an upcoming major cash injection into defence and a complete sell-out to foreign interests – notably those of the USA.
Never in the field of Kiwi conflict have so many words been written on behalf of so many people by so few and for so little effect.
It’s not all bad. The fact that there is a document that says “National Security Strategy” means we now have a document to debate and improve. The acknowledgement that the public must be taken into the conversation is long overdue – as long as it happens. The written acknowledgement that greater investment in defence is required is very significant.
READ MORE
- The ‘number 8 wire’ days for NZ’s defence force are over – new priorities will demand bigger budgets
- New Zealand’s National Security Strategy: Greater regional presence, Aussie ties, and questions
- New Zealand spies call out foreign interference, including by China, in first-of-its-kind report
- With China in sights, New Zealand signals major defense policy shift
I know you can hear the whistling of an incoming “BUT…”
A strategy it is not. It is what academics would call a ‘meta-policy.’ By its own admission it sits over the country’s:
- Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy
- Cyber Security Strategy
- Maritime Security Strategy
- Transnational Organised Crime Strategy
- Pacific Resilience Strategy
- Mass Arrivals Prevention Strategy
- Defence Policy Statements and White Papers
- National Space Policy
- Border Security Strategy
A strategy is contested. Its success can be measured. This is a policy dressed in strategy clothes. The best thing to potentially come out of this process is the creation of a National Intelligence and Security Agency. But that is not explicitly written only talked about.
The Defence Policy and Strategy Statement is little more than a re-hash of earlier documents such as the 2021 Assessment which followed Ron Mark’s ‘shell game’ that produced the 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Review and the 2019 Defence Capability Plan. These exercises in political pilates only stretch out acquisition times for new capabilities.
Then there are the Future Force Design Principles which “acts as a bridge between the high-level policy and strategy in the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 and detailed investment planning that will be included in a Defence Capability Plan.” – The latter document will be sometime next year. Only then will an acquisition process be initiated. When you take out the pictures and the fluff, there’s 1800 words on 5 pages wrapped around 11 principles. Three of these are ‘fixed’ and eight are ‘sliding principles.’
I checked several dictionaries and could not find one reference to sliding principles. The definition is related to ‘basic ideas or rules.’ A ‘sliding principle’ in the document looks like this:
Scalability – (Currently set to MEDIUM)
The extent to which the Defence Force is able to rapidly expand if required. It will improve its ability to rapidly expand or reduce its capabilities, and structures, allowing it to adapt to future changes in the strategic environment.
These are not principles. They are policy settings. I have seen this gobbledegook before. It came from Treasury in the form of high, medium and low capability tracks. It is a tool for Treasury analysts to fiddle with national security settings. My assessment at the time of the 2010 Defence White Paper stands. It’s in Hansard if you want to look it up. Just search for my name and ‘BS.’
What is missing in action is any sense of urgency. It is not good enough to mention China 12 times, Russia 7 times and point the tokotoko at a host of other threats then say nothing will happen until May’s budget in 2024.
Our situation can be summed up using the words of the late Major General Jim Molan (speaking about Australia). The New Zealand Defence Force lacks the mass, lethality and sustainability to engage in combat operations for longer than about 48 hours.
All the NZDF’s other outputs are derived from its combat capability.
The country has no war reserve of equipment.
Throwing money at this problem is not the solution either. The NZDF will take it all but seems incapable of substantially reforming itself. Too many headquarters, too many staff officers, not enough combatants and for many, too comfortable a life. They need to do their bit too and that is going to be very uncomfortable for them.
Reserves forces barely exist. Veterans – and I refer to everyone who has a service number in that group – need much better treatment. Even the minister admitted that but has done nothing more.
To do all this needs money as well as a sense of urgency. That means putting the economy – productivity especially – on a war footing. That is the only way we can create the national security we need now without leaving our children and grandchildren with the legacy of inter-generational debt.
A dollar spent on defence capability today takes years to come on line. In terms of the security environment we face, waiting until next year’s budget will be of little effect. It appears that’s how this government will be remembered.
Distinguished New Zealand soldier, Major General Sir Howard Kippenberger said in 1949:
It may be a good thing to continue doing nothing as at present and trust in the mercy of God to a people too selfish and lazy to help themselves. We can say, truly, that New Zealand cannot alone defend herself…so, perhaps, we had better leave it to others, or deny that there is any danger and get on with our amusements and the rapid erosion of our land. Or we can pull ourselves together and act as a grown-up Nation.
Kei wareware tatou Chunuk Bair
