The Australian Defence Strategic Review (DSR) published 24 April 2023 has significant implications for New Zealand’s defence investment choices. I’ll let those more qualified to comment reflect on the geo-political issues; in this article I’ll address the potential implications of the DSR for the next generation of New Zealand naval capability.  

The DSR is premised on the reality of great power competition in the Asia-Pacific, and the fact that the United States is no longer the unipolar dominant force in the region. Australia must be able to work with the United States to deter and defeat direct great power threats to its national interests and its sovereignty; the ADF must therefore be postured such that the likely cost of great power aggression against Australian interests outweighs any possible benefits to the aggressor.

Nuclear submarines will be a major component of this posture, but the DSR signals that the Australian surface fleet will be re-structured to better fit a strategy of “sea denial and localised sea control”. The main concept in play in modern naval force design is Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), and the DSR reference to a larger number of smaller surface vessels suggests that DMO concepts are likely to underpin the surface fleet review that will complete later this year.

“The greater the number of platforms in a given force, the greater the adversary’s targeting problem, and thus the greater the likelihood that sufficient platforms will survive an adversary’s pre-emptive strike to impose an unacceptable cost in retaliatory strikes against the adversary.”

To re-cap, the naval forces of the liberal democracies are facing significant numerical overmatch in relation to potential adversaries, because the cost of modern multi-function surface combatants has reached a level where even the United States can no longer afford to acquire a numerically sufficient force of high end destroyers and frigates. DMO therefore spreads the combat power of a naval force over both high-end combatants and a large number of less capable but fully networked combatants optimised for specific functions – primarily long-range strike and anti-surface warfare.

The greater the number of platforms in a given force, the greater the adversary’s targeting problem, and thus the greater the likelihood that sufficient platforms will survive an adversary’s pre-emptive strike to impose an unacceptable cost in retaliatory strikes against the adversary. DMO thus increases the deterrent effect of naval surface forces.

Multi-function combatants have a significant role to play in a force structured for DMO. They provide the sensor coverage, command and control and layered anti-missile defensive capabilities under which less capable platforms optimised for strike and anti-ship capability would operate. They would also probably be the only platforms capable of contributing to theatre anti-submarine operations.  

They would be the “Tier 1” platforms referred to in the DSR. However, DMO requires large numbers of less capable, mission specific “Tier 2” platforms, and as indicated in previous articles, therein lies an opportunity for New Zealand in designing our next generation naval fleet. In light of the DSR, mission specific surface combatants offer a way of giving effect to our commitment to the alliance with Australia that connects directly with a key plank of Australian defence policy.

Modularity, by which a fleet consists of common platforms that can be adapted for specific missions by the installation of equipment and people modules optimised for specific roles, offers a way in which platforms useful in a force constituted for DMO could also be useful in a range of other maritime security tasks.

When required for DMO in conjunction with Australia, a modular New Zealand naval platform could be fitted with maritime strike modules complete with the necessary missiles, sensors, operators and maintainers. When required for resource and border protection operations in the Pacific (a key DSR focus area), strike modules could be replaced with Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) modules.

In this way a force could be relevant and effective across the entire spectrum of operations, noting that the DSR specifically acknowledges New Zealand’s role in the Pacific.

Modularity also offers huge advantages in relation to obsolescence management. Capability upgrades can be carried out by upgrading or replacing the module while the platform remains available for other operations – multi-year capability gaps while a fleet of two non-modular combatants undergoes risky and expensive open-heart upgrade surgery are avoided.

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Lastly, and perhaps most significantly to those naval people responsible for the many different aspects of fleet availability, the platform standardisation allowed by modularity dramatically simplifies asset management by reducing the number of supply chains and training pipelines and the number of small, vulnerable to attrition work force communities trained in specific systems.

The Australian government has directed that an independent analysis of naval surface fleet capability be carried out to ensure complementarity with the forthcoming nuclear submarine fleet and consistency with the principles outlined in the DSR. This had led to a great deal of speculation amongst the defence commentariat.

A common theme is that the Hunter class frigate and Arafura class OPV programmes are likely to be truncated in favour of the larger number of smaller platforms referred to in the DSR – potentially mission specific Tier 2 combatants capable of contributing to DMO.

Should this occur, there would appear to be an opportunity for trans-Tasman cooperation along the lines of the Anzac frigate programme, noting that New Zealand interests (and arguably Australia’s) would be best served if these platforms were based on modularity concepts. Given the time it would take to re-orient the Australian National Ship Building Strategy from current to new programs, there should be time to study this possibility in depth.

In previous articles I have discussed an alternative force structure based on 3 – 4 through deck ships of the KALAAT BEN ABBES type designed by Fincantieri. These ships, and a later version being delivered to the Qatari navy, incorporate many of the capabilities of a frigate in addition to an amphibious capability of the type identified in DCP 19.

The flexibility offered by these ships could enable meaningful contributions to a deterrence/denial strategy while also enabling significant contributions to Pacific security. At the same time, defence disaster relief capacity in New Zealand and the Pacific would be greatly enhanced. This option is very much worthy of consideration.

If the alliance with Australia is as important as our policy rhetoric suggests, the emphasis on deterrence and denial embodied in the Australian DSR could move the value of a modular surface fleet beyond the theoretical, particularly if an industrial cooperation programme for modular Tier 2 combatants is practicable.

A force structure based on KALAAT BEN ABBES type ships would also enable a viable contribution to deterrence and denial while providing manoeuvre options in the Pacific and greatly enhanced disaster relief capability. I assume that the outcome of the Australian surface fleet review will be monitored with great interest in Wellington.