OPINION: The Ministry of Defence has laid out a sobering analysis of New Zealand’s national security situation. In its first sentence, the December 8 Defence Assessment declares Aotearoa “faces a substantially more challenging and complex strategic environment than it has for decades.”

The report is cogent and insightful, and I agree with its general assertion that “strategic competition” and climate change are the principal drivers of this deteriorating environment. Climate change will be clear enough to all Kiwis. I suspect, however, that “strategic competition” will be confusing for some.

A thorough reading of the Defence Assessment leaves little doubt as to what it means in this regard, even in the carefully edited version released to the public. Because the document will be discussed more than it is actually read, however, it’s important to unpack “strategic competition” to ensure a clear, shared understanding.

For some Kiwis, “strategic competition” may conjure notions of great powers – especially the United States and China – engaged in irresponsible rivalries distant from New Zealand’s values and interests. This view in turn can understandably prompt a pox-on-both-their-houses reflex.

Despite its diplomatic language, however, the Assessment makes clear China’s rising power and challenges to the rules-based international order are the chief drivers of strategic competition in this region. The United States, Australia, Japan, and other powers are largely seeking to shore up existing arrangements, institutions, and interests.

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In judging how to respond to the resulting tensions, the sole test for Kiwis in any particular situation must be whether New Zealand has a stake in these competing perspectives. To the extent competition is genuinely a function of mere hubris, New Zealanders very properly won’t have much sympathy for any competitors.

In areas where U.S.-China tensions feature prominently in the “strategic competition,” however, the Defence Assessment makes clear Aotearoa indeed has a profound interest in outcomes. While careful not to name Beijing, for instance, the report is clearly referencing the People’s Republic of China when it expresses concern about the “establishment of a military base or dual-use facility in the Pacific by a state that does not share New Zealand’s values and security interests.”

Aotearoa’s equities here should be crystal clear: The introduction of a Chinese base in the Pacific islands would be damaging to much New Zealand has attempted to accomplish in the South Pacific for generations.

How, then, should Kiwis prefer “strategic competition” to play out in this case? Would they rather more distant friends like Washington or Tokyo play no role in discouraging the introduction of such a base? Are they confident Wellington, the islands, and Canberra are better off handling the matter entirely on their own?

In the Indo-Pacific region more broadly, the Defence Assessment finds the most significant conflict risks – the points where strategic competition is most acute – are the Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Seas, the Korean Peninsula, and space/cyberspace. I’m confident that most Kiwis, on reflection, would agree New Zealand has a genuine stake in how each plays out.

Just to take one example, the Taiwan Strait is a potential flashpoint not because the United States or Japan or the Taiwan people want it to be. The stability of the Strait is more fragile than it has been for over sixty years because China in the last generation has amassed a huge strike force targeted against the island. It is this capability and Beijing’s increasingly aggressive posturing of it that is new and causes sober-minded observers to fear war.

Protected by an American deterrent shield for over seven decades, Taiwan has developed into a modern, law-based democracy and an economic miracle that trades extensively with Mainland China and, for that matter, Aotearoa. The status quo is acceptable to all players except Beijing, which has invested enormous resources into preparing to launch a modern war, with little warning, against a peaceful population nearly five times the size of New Zealand’s.

New Zealand’s interest here is manifest: that Beijing not invade Taiwan. The direct and indirect economic costs for Aotearoa would be staggering, and such an act of aggression would be a travesty of New Zealand’s principles. China’s existing cyber attacks on Aotearoa would surge massively, and the dangers of escalation would be truly frightening.

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In this particular instance of “strategic competition,” what should Kiwis prefer? That, to avoid any danger of war, the United States should bow out and leave Taiwan to fend for itself? How would that square with New Zealand’s economic interests or its support for peace and democracy?

In truth, maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait is complicated, and honest people can disagree over how best to proceed. My point here is merely that succumbing to a “pox-on-both-houses” reflex can all too easily be an unwitting exercise in dodging tough questions.

Fortunately, the New Zealand authorities display a high level of sobriety in assessing Aotearoa’s interests. The challenge increasingly is at the person-in-the-street level, as the benign environment New Zealand has enjoyed for decades continues to erode.

Kiwis are rightly proud of their country and its foreign policy. Given the realities of “strategic competition,” however, Aotearoa’s own interests and principles are providing a timely reminder why this foreign policy, while undoubtedly independent, cannot afford to be neutral.