In recent months, several highly regarded defence and security commentators have drawn attention to the geostrategic realities that New Zealand now faces in the Asia-Pacific region. This commentary has included speculation about the level of naval capability needed to meet our commitments to collective security while at the same time performing the wide spectrum of other defence and security missions required of our navy. There have been some interesting social media exchanges, most of which have been constructive.
Nonetheless, among the commentary, there has been a disturbing tendency to assume that “high end” naval capability is beyond New Zealand’s reach, and to advocate a naval force structure based around patrol capabilities. This article discusses emerging technological and doctrinal opportunities that offer a much wider and potentially affordable range of naval capability choice.
In the past, warship platforms and the weapon and sensor systems that they carried were tightly coupled in design terms. Ships were designed around specific systems and they were seldom much larger than they had to be to carry those systems over a specific distance, within a specific speed range, and in a specific range of environmental conditions.
When systems became obsolete and had to be replaced, ships had to be subjected to very expensive, time-consuming, and technically (and thus financially) risky midlife upgrades, because the new systems placed an entirely different set of demands on the basic platform for space and weight and for power, cooling, data, and other services. In addition, acquisition and sustainment funds had to be spread over all the systems permanently fitted to the fleet – every frigate (for example) always carried all the systems that it might need for all possible missions, no matter how it was likely to actually be employed.
These factors have led to the development of a technological strategy known as modularity. Broadly speaking, modularity decouples a warship’s mission systems (or payload) from the platform that carries them.
A modular warship is designed with the range, endurance, speed, and seakeeping characteristics for the range of missions that it may be required to undertake, but it is fitted with capability “modules” tailored to the needs of specific missions. These modules are typically based on transportable containers with standard interfaces for services like power, cooling and data, and are installed in modular ships according to need.
For example, a modular ship could be fitted with an anti-submarine warfare module and the people required to operate and maintain it and deployed to protect shipping in an area of tension. An identical platform could be fitted with modules to support Exclusive Economic Zone protection and deployable health services and deployed to support our Pacific partner nations. A third could be fitted with hydrographic survey capability and deployed to gather data for safe navigation. A fourth could be fitted with modules that support the protection of shipping passing through choke points from pirates and terrorist attacks, while a fifth carried modules for maritime mine counter-measures and diving support operations.
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Every platform would employ the same navigational, propulsion, electrical generation, command and control, communications, and habitability systems, greatly simplifying in service sustainment. A larger number of identical platforms would enable serial production efficiencies to be realised, reducing acquisition costs in comparison to small numbers of unique platforms tailored to specific functions.
Commentators have expressed justifiable concern that New Zealand’s contribution to collective security should be credible to our partners. Modularity supports that, in that investment could be focussed on acquiring only those modules needed to support likely missions.
When we had a four frigate fleet, every one of those was permanently equipped for all likely missions. With modularity, we might be able to focus investment on two anti-submarine warfare modules installed in platforms as required for training and operational deployments. This would make it easier to acquire meaningful, credible capability.
As indicated above, traditionally designed warships must be taken out of service for risky and lengthy midlife upgrades so as to remain viable. With a modular fleet, this would not be necessary. A mine-counter measures module, for example, could be upgraded in workshops ashore while the fleet of host platforms remained available for other missions. Major technology upgrades could be achieved by replacing the module entirely.
As new missions emerge and old missions disappear, new modules could be acquired, and old modules discarded, while the host platforms remained in service. Modularity thus removes the requirement for mid-life upgrades and supports a much more effective level of obsolescence management than has been possible until now.
As long as it was able to defend itself from the generic missile, torpedo, and small craft threat, a New Zealand platform fitted with a specialised capability module would fit well in such a force.
Emerging naval doctrine supports modularity. All liberal democracies are faced with the near certainty of numerical overmatch in relation to competitors, particularly China. The cost of acquiring exquisitely capable, multi-function naval combatants in sufficient numbers to address overmatch can no longer be borne, even by the United States. This has led to the emergence of a concept known as Distributed Maritime Operations, in which the capability of a naval force is spread over a large number of distributed, specialised platforms, albeit with multi-function combatants at its centre.
As long as it was able to defend itself from the generic missile, torpedo, and small craft threat, a New Zealand platform fitted with a specialised capability module would fit well in such a force.
Autonomous aerial, surface and underwater vehicles are now mainstream capabilities. They greatly extend surveillance coverage and reduce the need to expose crewed platforms to attack. Modularity is an excellent fit with autonomy. Autonomous vehicles are effectively capability modules in themselves and are designed to be moved from host platform to host platform according to need.
New Zealand would not be going out on a limb in exploring the potential of modularity. The United States Navy is running an advanced modularity test programme, and the Royal Navy is exploring modularity concepts along the lines of those proposed above for its next generation Type 32 frigate, which is also intended to deploy a wide range of autonomous capability.
All current naval acquisition programmes incorporate some level of modularity, including the very advanced Hunter class frigates being acquired by the Royal Australian Navy. Official module interface standards have already been issued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s standardisation agency.
Our navy currently consists of ten ships of six different classes. This creates an almost intolerable strain on our logistics and training organisations – supply chains, maintenance capability, and training systems have to be in place for several different types of system that perform identical functions in different ship classes. The fact that we have largely met fleet availability targets reflects great credit on the uniformed and civilian people that keep our fleet running. The next generation of fleet platforms must relieve this strain, and a fleet of common platforms with modularised capability could enable this.
Common modular platforms also offer a means whereby the standards of design and production excellence that characterise the New Zealand marine industry could be brought to bear in the wider national interest. If our industry can produce the most technologically advanced racing and superyachts in the world, it stands to reason that it has something to offer the next generation of naval capability.
It is not inconceivable that the platforms themselves could be built in New Zealand, perhaps with the aid of technology transfer from an overseas partner, but the real opportunity may lie in supply chain participation. There is also a real possibility that New Zealand industry could develop and supply some of the capability modules themselves. This aspect of the modularity opportunity must be explored.
With the exception of HMNZS Aotearoa, every ship in our existing fleet will reach the forecast end of its economical service life in a very short space of time – between 2032 and 2035. This presents both a major challenge and an opportunity to acquire a modular fleet tailored to New Zealand’s defence and security needs.
In the space available it has not been possible to address the full implications of modular capability, and for the naval practitioner this article perhaps poses more questions than it answers. In particular, this article has not addressed the signature management and damage resistance features required for high-end operations, and the cost implications that these would have for the common platform.
Nonetheless, the technological opportunity is real, and it converges with doctrinal developments in the shape of Distributed Maritime Operations. Whatever direction New Zealand naval capability development takes, the fact of mass obsolescence over a very short time frame is also real. As has been said elsewhere, lead times are such that the thinking necessary to address this fact must start now.
