Security Intelligence Service spies have discovered a New Zealander covertly gathering information for a foreign intelligence agency.

The person has been using both "overt and covert" methods to collect information about people in New Zealand who a foreign state believes are dissidents, according to the Security Intelligence Services (SIS).

This information is being reported to the foreign state's embassy in New Zealand, and the SIS is considering its legal options to “mitigate the threat posed by this individual”.

While the country behind this spying attempt has not been publicly named, China expert Professor Anne-Marie Brady says the spy will be working for China, as “foreign interference” in New Zealand almost always means the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

He said the release of this information could be the spooks saying: “We know what you’re doing.”

The SIS made the spy case public in its 2019/20 annual review, published on Friday, which reported a number of "case studies" in a level of detail the agency has been reluctant to provide in the past.

SIS director-general Rebecca Kitteridge​ this week told a parliamentary select committee that her agency was trying to be more open about its secretive work – a key recommendation of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Christchurch mosque terror attacks.

“Some local and central government figures are targets of foreign interference efforts that seek to influence New Zealand in directions that are beneficial to foreign state interests.”

“We have made great strides in presenting more information, there are case studies in our annual report, and I just think we're on that path. We will continue to push it,” she said on Wednesday.

The SIS, in its report, said it had investigated “activities of individuals linked to a number of states”, and it had disrupted the efforts of a person who was running interference for a foreign state by getting close to people in “senior and influential positions”.

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“Some local and central government figures are targets of foreign interference efforts that seek to influence New Zealand in directions that are beneficial to foreign state interests.”

The report also highlighted the country’s academic sector being targetted by foreign interference efforts, and a number of academic institutions which had collaboration “with institutions affiliated with foreign militaries”.

“A number of these collaborations are in fields where the research can be identified as dual-use, or applicable for both civil and military use.”

Brady, who submitted research detailing the CCP’s foreign interference attempts to Parliament last year, said the Government, for diplomatic reasons, would rarely attribute foreign interference activities to a country.

“The CCP targets the Chinese diaspora as it fears they could help nurture and support political change in China, and also to try and utilise their contacts and influence in foreign societies,” she said.

“The CCP targets New Zealand elites in order to develop access to important New Zealand institutions and people, in other words, for intelligence purposes.

“It also aims to try and shape New Zealand government policy on issues important to China and to access dual civil-military use technology.”

She said it was encouraging to see the SIS be more transparent, as the agency had said foreign interference was its most urgent priority “but there is very little public conversation about this”.

In another case, the SIS ran a year-long investigation into a person displaying violent “white identity extremist ideology” – or white supremacist ideology – both online and in person.

Capie said the SIS case study revelation showed the security agencies are “more willing to talk publicly about cases of foreign interference and threats against diaspora communities”.

“This one is interesting because it seems to be an ongoing investigation where they say the individual is ‘almost certainly’ collecting information on dissidents. One reading would be that it’s the agencies saying: We know what you’re doing.”

In the report, the SIS also provided examples of two counter-terrorism investigations. In one, a person who frequented online extremist forums was investigated for talking of launching a terror attack and sharing attack methods.

The SIS “provided advice to other government agencies and worked cooperatively to help mitigate the potential threat”.

In another case, the SIS ran a year-long investigation into a person displaying violent “white identity extremist ideology” – or white supremacist ideology – both online and in person.

“The individual has not specifically planned or prepared to conduct an act of ideologically motivated violence ... SIS assesses that their rhetoric is unlikely to manifest into any real-world violent behaviour.”

The royal commission’s report, released by the Government in December, said the “constrained” ability of the counter-terrorism agencies to talk about their successes had meant there was “at best limited public understanding” of the threat of terrorism.

“We wish to see discussion about counter-terrorism normalised ... The absence of such discussion to date has had consequences.”