AUKUS raises credibility questions for New Zealand’s naval power

The most important security issue currently facing New Zealand is working out our role with AUKUS. New Zealand’s most important security partners, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom have hugely upgraded their mutual security through the AUKUS partnership.

With the procurement of up to eight nuclear powered submarines through the AUKUS partnership, Australia will have one of the most formidable navies in the world.

Although there is no prospect of New Zealand being involved in any aspect of AUKUS that involves nuclear technology, AUKUS provides other opportunities for engagement. Pillar Two of AUKUS involves emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and quantum computing. Two of these are also directly relevant to the intelligence activities of Five Eyes. Quantum computing will allow GPS level accuracy without needing a satellite signal.

There is of course a prior question: to what extent does New Zealand want to upgrade its relationship with the AUKUS partners? This question could be put another way: is New Zealand prepared to accept a progressive downgrading of its relationships with the AUKUS nations – because that is surely what will happen if New Zealand does not participate in Pillar Two of AUKUS.

The Far-Left parties in Parliament have no doubt about their answer to these questions. The Green Party and Te Pati Maori want New Zealand to withdraw from all security relationships, and in particular, from Five Eyes. This stance extends to AUKUS.

The positions of these parties is well known, and in the case of the Green Party extends back many decades. However, these two parties also represent less than 20 percent of New Zealand voters, which has also been the case for decades. In short, there is a substantial majority in Parliament, and among New Zealand voters, that our current security relationships should be maintained, and be kept in good order.

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The majority position was well stated by Minister of Defence, Andrew Little, when he said in May this year that New Zealand had already picked a side decades ago. Although this statement was made with specific reference to New Zealand’s active support for Ukraine and the rule of law, no-one could mistake the broader meaning. On matters of security, New Zealand knows who its partners are.

Security relationships require a certain level of commitment, if they are to be taken seriously. Not slavishly, as New Zealand’s stand on Iraq showed, but at a sufficient level to be seen to be making a useful contribution.

Even in a proportionate sense, New Zealand’s contribution does not match that of the AUKUS partners, and this has been the case for many decades. Nevertheless, the contribution to security partnerships has to be more than token, it must add something of real value.

I have seen the treatment of a nation who was seen as only making a token, almost derisory effort. That was Greece in the Afghanistan mission. Greece paid a deep political and economic price for offering only 12 people to the Afghanistan mission. Only now, nearly two decades later, is Greece being accorded a more respectful position within NATO.

AUKUS is not just about technology transfer. Much more importantly, it is about reinforcing fundamental security relationships. The three partner nations have held together for over a century. This is also true of the two other Five Eyes nations, Canada and New Zealand.

The five nations, with their global trading links, have had a traditional focus on maritime power, these days, both encompassing both naval and air. At various times in the past, the greatest proportion of the five nations respective military strength has been primarily vested in naval and air power.

The pinnacle of the AUKUS partnership is the investment in nuclear powered submarines. This is truly an awesome level of commitment for a state with the economy and population of Australia.

It is not just two, three or four nuclear submarines, it is eight. To put this into perspective, the eight nuclear attack submarines will be more than the seven Astute class submarines in the Royal Navy and more than the six Barracuda nuclear attack submarines that the French Navy has ordered.

Australia is truly committed to building one of the most formidable navies in the world, surpassed only by those of the long-established nuclear powers.

The Australian naval build up is not just in the nuclear submarines, it is also reflected in the Australian Navy’s surface fleet. Australia already has three advanced air warfare destroyers. It is now replacing the eight ANZAC frigates with nine substantially larger Hunter class frigates.

At nearly 10,000 tonnes displacement, the Hunter class ships blur the traditional distinction between destroyers and frigates. Following the publication of the Defence Strategic Review earlier this year, a specific review of the surface combatant fleet was required, with a report back in September this year. Although the Hunter class project will be part of this review, a large amount of work has already been done on those ships.

There could be a reduction in numbers of the Hunter class made up by the possible acquisition of further air warfare destroyers. This would certainly bolster the combat power of the Australian Navy.

The greater focus is more likely to be on the next tier down. There have been proposals to build up to twelve corvettes or light frigates. These ships would be a very large step up from the current Armidale patrol vessels. Irrespective of the specific recommendations of the surface combatant review, one thing is certain – the Australian Navy surface fleet will be vastly more capable in 2040 than it currently is.

The level of increase in the capability of the Australian Navy will inevitably influence what New Zealand does. Will it be credible for New Zealand to simply retain a two frigate navy when there has been such a large increase in the size of the Australian Navy?

The decision to purchase two ANZAC frigates was made at a time, to use Helen Clark’s phrase, when there was a “benign strategic environment”. It is also worth noting that when these ships were purchased, New Zealand’s population was barely over three million compared to the 5.2 million of today.

Would simply buying just two more frigates run the risk of placing New Zealand in a similar predicament to that of Greece two decades ago?

Two frigates are not a token effort, though when both are out of service for an extended period, as was the case two years ago, that charge may have been levied. Nevertheless, a two frigate navy would amount to a major reduction of the proportion of total Trans Tasman naval power compared to twenty years ago.

Back in 2000 it could be reasonably said that New Zealand supplied around 15% of the total naval effort of Australia and New Zealand. In 2040 that percentage will be well under 10% and could be as low as 5% of the total trans-Tasman effort. At what point, will our most important security partner, Australia, think that New Zealand is not making a serious effort to keep the security relationship in good repair?

AUKUS is a serious challenge for New Zealand. Not so much over the specifics of the commitments, but more because it sends a strong signal as to how our closest security partners think of the evolving security situation, particularly in the Asia Pacific.

New Zealand now has to seriously think of how it will maintain its core security relationships. This is not a question that can be palmed off to Defence Ministers to manage. It will require the top leadership, the Prime Minister and aspiring Prime Ministers, to have a clear view as to what is required of New Zealand.

Just as AUKUS was introduced by the President and Prime Ministers of the three nations, so will New Zealand’s response need leadership from the top. Even if this not a major election issue, New Zealand’s role and contribution within AUKUS will be among the most important decisions to be made by our political leadership in the coming term of parliament.