Former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp forecasts that New Zealand will continue to deepen its relationship with China, and that it may diverge from Australia as it seeks to rebalance with China and the United States.

The burglaries of Canterbury University Professor Anne-Marie Brady’s home and offce prompted Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to ask the intelligence agencies to look into who might be behind it. Given that all indicators show that Chinese intelligence is the most likely culprit, this was an unusual move. The Prime Minister making such a public announcement about the matter will not have endeared her to China.

A more fully thought through construct of ideas was set out in the Prime Minister’s speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.

Under a heading of “Friends”, she listed four countries only and in a very specifc order: Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and China. Australia was noted as the only ally. The relationship with the United States was also seen as “fundamental”, but without any specifc reference to defence and security issues. Rather the reference was to the “size and dynamism” of its economy. In respect to China, the reference was also to the economy and trade.

In both cases she emphasised the areas of difference between New Zealand and the two larger countries. Does this indicate that New Zealand is subtly signaling a change in how it views its relationship with the great powers of the Asia Pacifc, one that will have greater balance between China and the United States?

It is logical to think so, since it refects the changing balance of power. United States pre-eminence is built upon events of nearly 80 years ago. Since then the power of the US has been eroded, especially in the last 20 years. Nevertheless, the US has been, and remains the key guarantor of Asia Pacifc stability.

New Zealand is part of the US led security framework, these days most notably through the Five Eyes intelligence sharing arrangements. These arrangements are based on values as much as economic and military power. 

They will bind New Zealand for many years to come.

In contrast, the relationship that New Zealand has with China has been largely transactional. The increasing depth of the economic linkages, including immigration, are adding a new dimension to the relationship. It has an enduring look about it. But for the moment there is almost no interaction in the security sphere.

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Will this remain the case over the next three decades?

China now has nearly the GDP of the United States and is expected to equal it within the next ten years. But it will not have equaled the sophistication of the US economy. It will still lag in terms of services and advanced technologies. But it is self-evident that this gap is closing, and by 2030 China might have largely closed it.

The differences in military capability will last longer. For instance, it will be at least two or more decades before China can build aircraft carriers equal to the United States Ford class carriers. Similarly, Chinese stealth fghters are still some decades behind those of the United States.

Nevertheless, within 30 years the gap will be much less than at present. Within East Asia and along the littoral margins, China may in fact have more military capability than the US. This will be of major concern to Japan, and perhaps South Korea. In particular Japan will ensure that it keeps a technological edge so as to render it a very tough nut.

Military and economic power are not just important in war, they affect the whole tenor of international relations. At the minimum, China will expect that Asia Pacifc nations will take its concerns more seriously. This is not the same as expecting nations to switch sides.

As a longstanding liberal democracy, New Zealand will not be allying itself with a one-party state. Similarly, there is insuffcient history that would give New Zealand any sense that China could act as a security guarantor. This role will continue to be flled by the US. But New Zealand will be in the outer orbit. As the Prime Minister’s speech reminded us, the United States is no longer an ally.

The decisions to be made by New Zealand’s political leaders are unlikely to be as stark as war and peace. Rather they will be matters in the broader security arena where New Zealand will prefer the argument of one state or the other, rather than simply deciding on the basis of security relationships. In that case, at least within the littoral margins of Asia, China will make gains, provided they are not overtly aggressive.

The South China Sea issues forecast the likely changes of attitude. The enormous build up by China in the South China Sea with the construction of airbases and harbours on reefs claimed by China has been able to take place with virtually no serious adverse reaction.

The Philippines, which had commenced arbitral proceedings pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas and won, has nevertheless negotiated the issue with China. New Zealand has done little more than express the view that it expects the matters with be resolved in accordance with international law.

Over a thirty-year period, New Zealand governments will come and go. But if the pattern of the last twenty years continues, New Zealand will continue to build and deepen its relationship with China, irrespective of who leads the government.

The last National government was among the frst OECD governments to embrace China’s Belt and Road initiative, although Winston Peters, the new Foreign Minister has expressed skepticism that New Zealand should have been so enthusiastic. It is also worth recalling that Helen Clark’s Labour government was the frst among developed nations to sign a free trade agreement with China.

This has all been done without any real impact on the relationship with the United States. In fact, the last National government took considerable steps to strengthen the US relationship.

It is unlikely, however, that the Jacinda Ardern-led administration will take any further steps to enhance the US relationship. In fact, it is likely that the US relationship will become less close. Jacinda Ardern’s speech to the Institute indicated that New Zealand will be seeking balance.

As China’s power increases over the next few years, this could prove to be a challenging task. There are likely to be more occasions in the future where New Zealand will have to make choices on diffcult issues. Sitting on the sidelines may not always be possible, though New Zealand will endeavor to make that choice whenever it is possible.

What about the situations where sitting on the sidelines is not possible? Such situations should only arise in extremis, and there are likely to be two critical factors dictating the choice. What would a values-based approach indicate, and what is our one ally, Australia, doing? Students of realpolitik would emphasise the latter.

New Zealand has shown in the past that it is quite capable of taking a different direction to Australia, even when that puts signifcant strain on the Trans-Tasman relationship. The nuclearfree issue and the consequent disruption of ANZUS being the most prominent. Such situations are likely to occur in the future as well. They key question is whether New Zealand would be willing to jeopardise the core foundations of the Trans-Tasman relationship.

New Zealand is unlikely to do so as a matter of formal policy choice. But such an outcome might occur by inadvertence if New Zealand had made a series of foreign policy choices about its relationship with China and the US that effectively imperiled the TransTasman relationship. One should expect that this prospect is likely to increase within the next thirty years as the balance of power shifts.